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INTRODUCTION
In 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the world, “[I]f
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept
of our common humanity?”1 Thirteen years later, the international
community still has not reached a consensus on this question. In a
September speech before the UN General Assembly on Syria’s use of
chemical weapons, U.S. President Barack Obama echoed Annan’s query:
Different nations will not agree on the need for action in every instance,
and the principle of sovereignty is at the center of our international order.
But sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder,
or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye. . . .
[S]hould we really accept the notion that the world is powerless in the
face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica?2

Due to the diplomatic resolution of the Syrian crisis, the international
community again did not resolve this difficult issue. Yet states have drawn
firm lines in the sand on the appropriate contours of an international
response to crises like Syria. This Note traces the history and development
of the responsibility to protect doctrine from its inception to the Syrian
crisis and advocates for reform to better effectuate the doctrine’s ideals.

1. KOFI A. ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 48 (2000), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/wethepeople.pdf.
2. Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2013 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 655, at 8 (Sept. 24, 2013).
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I. THE PRE-UNITED NATIONS HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Though many believe humanitarian intervention3 to be a product of
the 1990s, it is widely considered to be a creation of the 19th century.4
Throughout the 1800s, in addition to wars of conquest and colonialism,
states engaged in wars with varying levels of humanitarian justifications.5
Many of these interventions were undertaken by powerful European states
to end massacres of Christian civilians in the territory of the Ottoman
Empire. British philhellenes steered the UK into a war to save the Greeks
from extinction at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s.6 In 1860,
Napoleon III dispatched French legions to save Syrian Christians from
being massacred by the Druze.7 In 1876, British newspapers implored
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli for intervention in Bulgaria, as reporters
detailed the slaughter and burning of between 5000 and 25,000 Bulgarian
villagers,8 mostly women and children, by Ottoman forces.9
In the 1800s, the majority of scholars agreed that the use of force,

3. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as action
1. Carried out in, or intended to affect events within, a foreign state or states – it is an
intervention;
2. Aimed at the government of the target state(s), or imposed on and only accepted reluctantly
by it/them – it is thus coercive, albeit not necessarily involving use of force; [and]
3. Intended, at least nominally (and at least to some extent actually), to avert, halt, and/or
prevent recurrence of large-scale mortality, mass atrocities, egregious human rights abuses or
other widespread suffering caused by the action or deliberate inaction of the de facto
authorities in the target state(s).
D. J. B. Trim & Brendan Simms, Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 4 (Brendan Simms & D. J. B. Trim eds., 2011).
4. Though one can argue that the Crusades were a type of religious humanitarian intervention (at
least in the view of the Catholic Church), states only began justifying intervention in humanitarian
terms in the nineteenth century. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203,
205–06 (1974); see also GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 5 (2008) (arguing that nineteenth-century European states were the first to undertake
humanitarian interventions).
5. For example, Greece (1827–1830), Syria (1860–1861), Crete (1866–1868), BosniaHerzegovina and Bulgaria (1876–1878), and Macedonia (1903–1908, 1912–1913). See Fonteyne,
supra note 4, at 207–13 (describing each of these conflicts). For a deeper look into humanitarian
intervention in the 19th century, see generally BASS, supra note 4.
6. BASS, supra note 4, at 47–49. The Greek cause also inspired support from the American
public and from prominent American politicians such as Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 88–99. Though such
support pressured the Monroe administration to support the Greeks, the United States did not become
involved in the conflict. Id.
7. Id. at 155–57.
8. The newspapers disagreed dramatically on how many Bulgarians were killed. Bass estimates
it was “probably in the range of 12,000.” Id. at 260.
9. Id. at 256–265.
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including humanitarian intervention, was legal under international law.10
After the devastation of World War I, however, several powerful states
created the League of Nations and agreed to end conquest, legally
restricting the use of force for the first time.11 Between World War I and
World War II, scholars debated whether humanitarian intervention had
been assimilated into customary international law.12 After World War II,
the United Nations further restricted the use of force and invested in a
paradigm of collective security.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE UNITED
NATIONS
The UN Charter explicitly bans the threat of or use of force against
another state.13 The only exceptions to this prohibition are actions in
individual or collective self-defense14 or actions approved by the Security
Council.15 As such, the Charter and international law do not permit
retaliation for violations of international law norms or provide an
enforcement mechanism for such violations.16 The Charter authorizes
members to utilize regional security arrangements17 but prohibits such
entities from taking enforcement actions without authorization from the
Security Council.18
The responsibility to protect was conceptualized under this framework
of collective security by Francis Deng.19 Under this doctrine, Deng

10. Fonteyne, supra note 4, at 223.
11. See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10, 12, 15; see also CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: KOSOVO, IRAQ AND THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION
45–46 (2009) (noting that the Covenant of the League of Nations “represented the first serious attempt
to legally restrict the use of force by formal means, although mainly through procedural, not
substantive, provisions”).
12. Fonteyne, supra note 4, at 223–26.
13. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
14. U.N. Charter art. 51. The parameters of self-defense or collective self-defense are interpreted
restrictively. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 77–79 (June 27) (rejecting the assertions of self-defense by the United States and adopting a
narrow reading of justifiable self-defense under Chapter 51 and customary international law).
15. U.N. Charter arts. 39–42.
16. Michael N. Schmitt, The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law
Justifications, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 744, 750 (2013).
17. U.N. Charter art. 52.
18. U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
19. See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN AFRICA (1996). Deng was appointed the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on
Internally Displaced Persons in 1993. ALEX J. BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 10 (2011). At this post, he argued that states, as a part of their
sovereign responsibility, are obligated to accept international aid when they are unable to provide for
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emphasized the responsibility inherent in sovereignty. He argued that at
the core of this responsibility is the state’s obligation to protect its citizens
from violence.20 If a state fails to protect its nationals from harm, the
international community must undertake the responsibility to do so.21
Subsequently, Secretary-General Annan endorsed Deng’s theory. In the
wake of the Kosovo intervention, he insisted that traditional notions of
sovereignty have been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be
instruments at the service of their peoples.”22 Implicit in this statement is
the idea that sovereignty encompasses not only the privileges of power but
also responsibilities to the citizenry.
Two years later, after the UN’s failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda,
Secretary-General Annan asked the international community to address
humanitarian intervention.23 The result was Canada’s creation of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).24
The ICISS brought the discourse on “sovereignty as responsibility” to the
forefront and expanded and elaborated on Deng’s framework. In its 2001
Report, the ICISS identified three elements of the responsibility to
protect,25 which are applicable to situations involving crimes that shock the
conscience of mankind, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing.26 The first is
the responsibility to prevent, under which states should tackle the root
causes of conflicts before emergencies erupt.27 Under the second element,
the responsibility to react, states should respond to crises through sanctions,
military interventions, or other appropriate measures.28 The final element,
the responsibility to rebuild, involves states providing assistance to states

the well-being of their citizens. Id. at 10–11; see also THERESA REINOLD, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE POWER OF NORMS AND THE NORMS OF THE POWERFUL 54–55
(2013) (describing Deng’s theory as a “dual social contract” between a government and its citizens and
between states and the international community).
20. DENG ET AL., supra note 19, at 32–33.
21. Id. at 212–23.
22. Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49, 49, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/324795.
23. Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General
Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999); see also INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION &
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT vii (2001), available at http://responsibilityto
protect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (describing Secretary-General Annan’s speech and the creation of the
ICISS).
24. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 23, at vii.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 19–23.
28. Id. at 29–35.
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recovering from crises.29
Following the publication of the ICISS report, the responsibility to
protect remained a topic of discussion within the international community
and gained widespread support. At the 2005 World Summit, 190 states
produced an agreement declaring, in part, that every state has a
responsibility to protect its citizenry and to prevent genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.30 Furthermore, should a
state fail to uphold this mandate, the international community has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic and peaceful means to protect
the civilian population.31 In the event that such means are inadequate, the
Security Council should be prepared to take “timely and decisive” action in
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.32 These commitments
were affirmed by the Security Council in 2006 and reaffirmed by the
General Assembly in 2009.33
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also embraced the responsibility
to protect, publishing three reports on its status and implementation.34 His
conceptualization of the responsibility to protect contains three “pillars,”
similar to the ICISS’ three elements.35 The pillars are non-sequential and
of equal significance.36 The first pillar is the state’s responsibility to
protect its citizenry, originating in the basic tenets of sovereignty.37 The
second pillar revolves around the responsibility of the international
community to help states fulfill the responsibilities described in the first
pillar.38 The final pillar concerns intervention consistent with the UN
Charter if a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its citizens as described
29. Id. at 39–44.
30. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16,
2005). The World Summit Outcome was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. Alex
Bellamy & Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law, in THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 89 (2011).
31. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 30, ¶ 139.
32. Id.
33. Bellamy & Reike, supra note 30, at 81.
34. See U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010); U.N. Secretary-General,
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan.
12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect]; U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of
Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 28, 2011).
35. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, ¶ 11.
36. See BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 35.
37. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, ¶ 11(a). The Secretary-General
identifies four crimes that are at the core of a state’s protection responsibilities: genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Id. ¶ 13.
38. Id. ¶ 11(b).
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in the first pillar.39 Like the World Summit Outcome and the ICISS report,
Secretary-General Ban’s reports assigned exclusive rights to authorize an
intervention under the responsibility to protect to the UN Security
Council.40
III. INTERVENTION IN PRACTICE
The Security Council has been bitterly divided over whether
humanitarian intervention is justified by the responsibility to protect,
Indeed, the
especially with respect to unilateral intervention.41
responsibility to protect has been described as “the most difficult thematic
debate in the Security Council.”42 This discord has been reflected in
several conflicts over the last two decades. Several interventions, both
through the Security Council and through unilateral action, have been
justified on humanitarian grounds.43 In other instances, the international
community has failed to intervene during or prevent the commission of
devastating human rights violations, including genocide.44 The following
section highlights this debate.
A. Kosovo
In the late 1990s, tensions between the various ethnic groups of the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) escalated into civil war.45
As the state dissolved, the UN was unable to prevent ethnic cleansing,
widespread bloodshed, and horrific war crimes from sweeping across the
region.46 Kosovo, a small region in the FRY, was pulled into the violent
political vacuum.47 After failing to prevent atrocities in neighboring
Balkan states, the Security Council passed a series of Chapter VII
39. Id. ¶ 11(c).
40. Id.
41. In this Note, unilateral action refers to both intervention undertaken by collective security
arrangements, such as NATO, and individual state action.
42. REINOLD, supra note 19, at 61.
43. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (Jul. 31, 1994); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
44. See infra Part III.C.
45. For a more detailed history of the conflict, see generally Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the
Twentieth Century: A Historical Account, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 19
(Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000).
46. Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo, the Changing Contours of World Politics, and
the Challenge of World Order, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 45, at 1,
2–7.
47. Id.
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enforcement resolutions attempting to address the violent conditions in
Kosovo.48 The resolutions described the situation in Kosovo as a threat to
international peace and security, but the Security Council could not agree
on a course of action.49
Meanwhile, the human rights situation in Kosovo was deteriorating.
The NATO states, weary of the UN’s failure to prevent the massacre in
Srebrenica,50 were growing restless. U.S. President Bill Clinton cited
human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made
justifying intervention in Kosovo.51 After failed peace efforts, NATO
began to discuss a limited air campaign against the Serbian forces accused
of terrorizing the civilian population.52 Before initiating airstrikes,
Germany, France, and the UK preferred to secure authorization for the use
of force from the Security Council, while the United States argued that
NATO independently possessed the legitimacy to use force.53 U.S.
National Security Advisor Sandy Bergen, articulating the Clinton
administration’s position, stated, “We always prefer to operate pursuant to
a U.N. resolution. But we’ve always taken the position that NATO has the
authority in situations it considers to be threats to the stability and security
of its area to act by consensus without explicit U.N. authority.”54 After
further diplomatic measures failed, NATO began a bombing campaign in
Kosovo.55
Russia and China harshly criticized NATO’s military strikes. Russian
officials, nevertheless, arguably pushed the NATO powers into
independent action. In private, Russian diplomats reportedly assured
NATO foreign ministers, “If you take it the UN we’ll veto it. If you don’t
48. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (demanding cooperation with
OSCE and NATO verification missions); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998)
(expressing “deep[] concern” and calling for a ceasefire); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar.
31, 1998) (imposing an arms embargo under Chapter VII).
49. TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 182–85 (2000) (describing the conflicting
positions of the permanent five Security Council members before NATO initiated its bombing
campaign).
50. In July of 1995, the UN “safe area” protecting Srebrenica collapsed, and 8000 Muslim
civilians were massacred. Id. at 120.
51. NICHOLAS KERTON-JOHNSON, JUSTIFYING AMERICA’S WARS: THE CONDUCT AND PRACTICE
OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION 63–64 (2011).
52. JUDAH, supra note 49, at 121.
53. For a discussion of the positions of the permanent five Security Council members (the P5)
and other states in the Kosovo debate, see generally KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 45, at 83–148.
54. Sandy Berger, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, United States, Press Briefing (Mar. 25, 1999) (transcript
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47833).
55. Schnabel & Thakur, supra note 46, at 4.
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we’ll just denounce you. . . . [W]e’ll just make a lot of noise.”56 Publicly,
Russian officials condemned the NATO campaign, arguing, “Enforcement
elements have been excluded from the draft resolution, and there are no
provisions in it that would directly or indirectly sanction the automatic use
of force.”57 Russia submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution
describing NATO actions as a “flagrant violation of the United Nations
Charter,”58 which was defeated by twelve votes to three.59 China similarly
condemned NATO action, maintaining, “When the sovereignty of a
country is put in jeopardy, its human rights can hardly be protected
effectively. Sovereign equality, mutual respect for State sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of others are the basic principles
governing international relations today.”60
After NATO action ceased, the UN created the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo to investigate the intervention.61 The
Commission concluded that NATO intervention was “illegal but
legitimate.”62 It further determined that “the intervention [had been]
justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because
the intervention had [had] the effect of liberating the majority population of
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”63 In order to
better respond to future crises, the Commission encouraged the
international community to work through the UN and to close the gap
between legality and legitimacy.64
B. Libya
The conflict began in February 2011, as protests against General
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime spread to cities throughout Libya.65 General
56. JUDAH, supra note 49, at 183.
57. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3937 (Oct. 24, 1998).
58. S.C. Res. 328, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999).
59. U.N. Press Release SC/6659, supra note 58. China, Namibia, and Russia voted for the
Resolution. Id. Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States rejected the resolution. Id.
60. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8 (Sept. 22 1999).
61. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 14 (2000), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10–11.
65. Aidan Hehir, Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, in LIBYA: THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 1, 1–11 (Aidan
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Muammar Qaddafi responded violently, and his forces killed dozens of
demonstrators.66 On February 20, 2011, the protests escalated into
rebellion, and rebel forces captured several Libyan cities, including
Benghazi.67 In response to General Qaddafi’s threats to take action against
civilians, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which implemented
a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and authorized Member States to “take
all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.68 NATO airstrikes, led
by the United States, France, and the UK, commenced hours after the
resolution was passed.69
The United States defended the legitimacy and desirability of such
strikes on humanitarian grounds. President Obama argued, “[W]hen
someone like Qaddafi threatens a bloodbath that could destabilize an entire
region; and when the international community is prepared to come together
to save many thousands of lives—then it’s in our national interest to act.
And it’s our responsibility. This is one of those times.”70 Echoing the
president, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh advised the
American Society of International Law that
[Qaddafi’s] illegitimate use of force not only is causing the deaths of
substantial numbers of civilians among his own people, but also is
forcing many others to flee to neighboring countries . . . . Qaddafi has
forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a
serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection . . . .71

Other states, however, did not support Western military intervention.
Russia and China, along with several developing states, were infuriated
about the extent of NATO air strikes, contending that NATO states
overextended Resolution 1973’s civilian protections as a pretext for Libyan
regime change.72 Some commentators argued that advocates of the Libyan
Hehir & Robert Murray eds., 2013).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). Russia and China abstained
from voting on the resolution. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves “No-Fly
Zone” over Libya, Authorizing “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour
with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
69. David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces in Libya, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/africa/20libya.html.
70. The President’s Weekly Address, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 203, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2011).
71. Harold Hongku Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement Regarding Use of Force
in Libya before the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2011) (emphasis
added) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm).
72. Simon Tisdell, The Consensus on Intervention in Libya Has Shattered, GUARDIAN, Mar. 23,
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intervention had impaired the development of the responsibility to protect
by intensifying Russian and Chinese distrust of humanitarian
interventions.73 Further, others believed that the Obama administration and
other NATO states had wrongly applied the responsibility to protect.74
C. Genocide—and the Responsibility to Protect—Ignored?
While the success of the international efforts to alleviate human rights
violations in Kosovo and Libya are debatable, the international community
has wholly failed to respond to several other severe human rights
violations.75 Secretary-General Annan created an independent inquiry into
the UN’s failed response to the Rwandan genocide.76 The inquiry
determined that over the course of about 100 days in the spring of 1994,
approximately 800,000 Rwandans were killed.77 According to the inquiry,
the international community’s failure to prevent or to stop those killings
was attributable to a “persistent lack of political will by Member States to
act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”78 This lack of political will—and,
in some cases, the presence of political opposition—characterizes the
failure to act in several of the most severe human rights violations since
World War II.
The complicated conflict in Sudan also tested the international
community’s resolve in the face of significant civilian causalities, a pattern
of human rights abuses, and substantial internal displacement.79 The

2011, 11:11 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-ceasefire-consensusrussia-china-india.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Steven Groves, Obama Wrongly Adopts U.N. “Responsibility to Protect” to Justify
Libya Intervention, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/
03/libya-intervention-obama-wrongly-adopts-un-responsibility-to-protect (arguing that R2P could
constrain future U.S. action); David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html (arguing that NATO “distorted” the doctrine,
threatening the legitimacy of the international system).
75. Though it occurred before ICISS’s report, the international community’s response to the
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia is also notable in this regard. When Vietnam intervened in
Cambodia to oust Pol Pot from power, approximately 800,000 Cambodians had been killed. Sophie
Quinn-Judge, Fraternal Aid, Self-Defence, or Self-Interest? Vietnam’s Intervention in Cambodia, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra note 3, at 343, 343–62. Thousands more were
starving and/or enslaved. Id. Yet, the coup was almost universally condemned. Id.
76. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 18, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/339 (Mar. 26, 1999).
77. Indep. Inquiry into the Actions of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Rep.,
transmitted by letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
78. Id.
79. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the
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conflict was centered in Darfur, a region of Western Sudan where
desertification and drought had led to starvation and underdevelopment.80
The Sudanese government was unable or unwilling to alleviate the
suffering in Darfur, and as a result, unrest in the area grew.81 Tension
between non-Arab and Arab tribes over access to resources mounted.82 In
2003, violence escalated, and two non-Arab rebel groups, the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),
declared an open rebellion against the government.83 In response, the
Sudanese government employed Arab tribal militias84 to supplement the
army and to quash the JEM and SLM uprising.85 A UN report found that
“the armed forces and their proxy militias punished certain populations
collectively for belonging to the same ethnic group as the rebels, and
inflicted terror upon them.”86 Despite recent peace agreements and the
partition of the country into two states, violence has continued, and the
region remains unstable.87 The UN estimates that 300,000 Sudanese have
died as a result of the violence, and 2.7 million Sudanese are displaced,88

Sudan, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3 (May 7, 2004).
80. See generally NOAH R. BASSIL, THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND CIVIL WAR IN SUDAN: THE
ORIGINS OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR (2013) (providing a more detailed account of the origins and
complexities of the conflict in Darfur).
81. REINOLD, supra note 19, at 66–67.
82. Id. Racial and religious tensions were not new problems in Sudan. British colonizers had
stitched together a diverse group of ethnicities and tribes among arbitrary boundaries and ruled Sudan
as two states. See KWASI KWARTENG, GHOSTS OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN’S LEGACIES IN THE MODERN
WORLD 253–72 (2011) (describing Britain’s partition and colonization of Sudan). Colonialism
undermined the creation of a national Sudanese identity and instead produced tribalism, segregation,
and racism among the Sudanese citizenry. BASSIL, supra note 80, at 88.
83. BASSIL, supra note 80, at 88. The conflict was, however, far more complicated than a racial
or religious war. Id. at 1–2. Race and religion were important factors in the conflict, but there were
other issues involved. The Islamist state had alienated the periphery of the country and lacked complete
control. Id.
84. REINOLD, supra note 19, at 67 (describing the indiscriminate use by many militias of a
“scorched earth” policy against civilians and rebels); Julie Flint, Beyond ‘Janjaweed:’ Understanding
the Militias of Darfur (Small Arms Survey, Human Sec. Baseline Assessment, Working Paper No. 17,
2009), available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf (describing the Arab militias’ composition of nomadic Arab tribesman,
radicalized Islamists, former criminals, and the unemployed).
85. See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 79, at 3, 6 (noting that the Sudanese
government initially denied supporting or arming the militias but that its use of the militias has been
well-documented by the UN).
86. Id. at 17.
87. Rick Gladstone, Number of Darfur’s Displaced Surged in 2013, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/world/africa/number-of-darfurs-displaced-surged-in-2013.html;
Nicholas Kulish, Civilians Trying to Flee South Sudan Violence Are Caught Between Two Sides, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/world/africa/south-sudan.html?_r=0.
88. UN Welcomes Accord Signed Between Sudan and Darfur Rebel Group, UN NEWS CENTRE
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with 300,000 citizens displaced in 2013 alone.89
Despite international media attention and widespread calls for
intervention, UN Member States lacked the political commitment to invoke
the responsibility to protect or to take any decisive action to prevent these
ongoing widespread human rights violations.90 Limited UN intervention,
such as the supervised disarmament of Arab militias, deployment of a
limited number of specially trained troops, and/or the enforcement of a nofly zone, could have mitigated or prevented the crisis.91 This lack of action
led one scholar to remark, “If Darfur is the first ‘test case’ of the
responsibility to protect, there is no point in denying that the world has
failed the entry exam.”92
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND SYRIA
On August 21, 2013, a chemical weapons attack was perpetrated
against Syrian citizens in the Ghouta region of Damascus.93 According to
reports, this incident was the culmination of a series of chemical attacks
perpetrated by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians.94 Syria’s use of
chemical weapons violated its treaty commitments and customary
international law; the 1925 Geneva Protocol95 and the 1993 Chemical

(July 14, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39044&Cr=Darfur&Cr1.
89. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. S/2013/420 (July 12, 2013).
90. See EKKEHARD STRAUSS, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES?: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 116–17 (2009) (arguing that the absence of
political will led to a UN response that lacked “any coherent strategy”).
91. See INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT NO. 89, DARFUR: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT i–iii
(2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/Darfur%20
The%20Failure%20to%20Protect.pdf (recommending various measures to respond to the crisis).
92. LEE FEINSTEIN, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES 1,
38 (Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 22, 2007), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/DarfurCSR22.pdf.
93. United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of
Damascus on 21 August 2013, transmitted by letter dated Sept. 13, 2013 addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_
of_CW_Investigation.pdf (finding evidence of sarin gas use in the Ghouta region). While the
international community has almost universally condemned these attacks, the Assad regime vehemently
denied that it is responsible. Brian Stelter, Assad Denies Chemical Attack in Interview for U.S. Viewers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/business/media/assad-denies-attack-ininterview-with-charlie-rose.html?_r=0.
94. See, e.g., Letter from Jon Day, Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, to David Cameron,
Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use (Aug. 29, 2013), available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_
PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf.
95. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
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Weapons Convention96 explicitly ban the use of chemical weapons,
although they contain no enforcement provisions.
Yet even before the use of chemical weapons, tension among the
Security Council powers over Syria was mounting. Russia and China
vetoed several resolutions authorizing sanctions on the Assad regime.97
After the third veto, the British ambassador, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, stated
that the UK was “appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto this
resolution aimed at ending the bloodshed in Syria.”98 U.S. ambassador
Susan Rice stated that the vote reflected that “two permanent members of
the Council are prepared to defend Assad to the bitter end.”99 The chemical
weapons attacks further increased tensions in the Security Council. Before
a diplomatic solution100 was reached, the governments of the permanent
members articulated starkly different policy positions. This section traces
the views of the permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) on
the responsibility to protect and concludes by examining the ways in which
these positions have affected the doctrine.
A. The United States
The United States’ response to the responsibility to protect has varied
by administration. The Clinton administration was the first to engage with
the responsibility to protect as articulated by the ICISS and SecretaryGeneral Annan,101 seeming to endorse a neo-Wilsonian worldview with
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
96. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
97. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria
That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation, U.N.
Press Release SC/10714 (July 19, 2012).
98. Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russiaand-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html.
99. Id.
100. See S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013) (condemning the use of chemical
weapons in Syria and authorizing a UN-led team to destroy Syrian chemical stockpiles).
101. However, the United States has long debated the merits of humanitarian justifications for
military action. For example, in 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt argued that the United States has
a duty to intervene when crimes committed abroad are “‘so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror,”
that “[i]n extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper,” and that “we could interfere by force of
arms . . . to put a stop to intolerable conditions.” BASS, supra note 4, at 3. Similarly, President William
McKinley declared, “The American people never shirk a responsibility and never unload a burden that
carries forward civilization.” Mike Sewell, Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism:
The American War with Spain, 1898, and After, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 303. Contrast President McKinley’s and President Roosevelt’s statements with the realist
perspective of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who, after the Kosovo intervention, admonished
British Prime Minister Tony Blair for not respecting traditional sovereignty principles. BASS, supra
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respect to intervention and the use of force.102 Some commentators labeled
this the Clinton Doctrine, namely “that the United States cannot respond to
all humanitarian disasters and human rights transgressions, but that it will
use its power and good offices if doing so will make a difference and the
costs are acceptable.”103
In contrast, the Bush administration was far more skeptical of the
responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. Though it never
“flatly rejected” the responsibility to protect, it demonstrated reluctance to
be “forced to save strangers.”104 Further, UN ambassador John Bolton
stated, “[T]his so-called right of humanitarian intervention . . . is just a
gleam in one beholder’s eye but looks like flat-out aggression to someone
else.”105
Throughout his term in office, President Obama has been vague about
his administration’s perspective on the legality of humanitarian
intervention without a Security Council Resolution.106 Throughout the
Syrian crisis, the importance that the Obama administration seemed to
attach in its use of force calculus to the use of chemical weapons became
evident.107 In August 2012, President Obama, albeit in an unscripted
note 4, at 11. Similarly, Kissinger had no qualms about dealing with the Khmer Rouge, advising a
colleague, “Tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we
won’t let that stand in our way.” Id. at 11–12.
102. Tony Smith, Wilsonianism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 617
(Alexander DeConde et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that after World War I, Wilson forcefully argued
that the United States should prioritize the promotion abroad of democratic governance and of national
self-determination).
103. G. John Ikenberry, The Costs of Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the
Contemporary Order, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE
INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 45, at 85, 87.
President Clinton stated, “[W]here we can, at an acceptable cost . . . we ought to prevent the slaughter
of innocent civilians and the wholesale uprooting of them because of their race, their ethnic
background, or the way they worship God.” Interview with Jim Lehrer of PBS’ “Newshour,” 1999
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1091, 1095–96. As discussed in Section IV, the Clinton administration
demonstrated this worldview through interventions in Somalia and Kosovo.
104. REINOLD, supra note 19, at 61–62 (noting that the Bush administration sought to prevent
opinio juris from forming around the concept). In short, the Bush administration wished to preserve the
freedom to intervene without the obligation to do so. Id.
105. BASS, supra note 4, at 15.
106. However, even before the use of chemical weapons, the Obama administration endorsed the
possibility of intervention in Syria without a Security Council resolution. For example, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta used a NATO-led force as an example of a legally sound basis for intervention.
Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Syria Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th
Cong. 43–45 (2012) (statement of Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, United States) (citing NATO’s
Bosnia intervention as legally sound precedent under international law).
107. Here, the administration could have been seeking to combine humanitarian justifications with
national security interests on arms control. See Krista Nelson, Syria Insta-Symposium: The Significance
of Chemical Weapons Use Under International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 6, 2013, 1:30 PM EDT),
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comment, described the transport or use of chemical weapons as a “red
line” that would alter his position on the situation in Syria.108 He seemed to
suggest that the universal acceptance in the international community of the
chemical weapons ban and the longevity of this consensus factor into his
analysis of the use of force without a Security Council authorization.109 In
a UN speech, he argued that the international community must
“meaningfully enforce a prohibition whose origins are older than the
United Nations itself.”110
The American push for action met with fierce opposition from other
states, including Russia and China.111 This discord led the Obama
administration to express willingness to act outside a Security Council
mandate. President Obama opined, “[G]iven Security Council paralysis on
this issue, if we are serious about upholding a ban on chemical weapons
use, then an international response is required and that will not come
through Security Council action.”112 Shortly after making this statement,
the White House circulated a joint statement supporting the President’s
position, signed by eleven of the G20 nations.113 In part, this statement
warned, “The world cannot wait for endless failed processes that can only
lead to increased suffering in Syria and regional instability.”114 However,

http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/06/syria-insta-symposium-significance-chemical-weapons-useinternational-law/ (describing the Obama administration’s use of arms control and humanitarian
justifications when calling for action in Syria).
108. See The President’s News Conference, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 656, at 6 (Aug. 20,
2012). In a press meeting the following day, the administration did not discredit this characterization.
See Josh Earnest, Principal Deputy Press Sec’y, White House, Press Gaggle en route Columbus, OH
(Aug. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/21/pressgaggle-principal-deputy-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-colu). Subsequently, President Obama
characterized the red line as the world’s “red line.” The President’s News Conference with Prime
Minister John Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden in Stockholm, Sweden, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 599,
at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013).
109. See 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 655, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the chemical weapons
ban “has been agreed to by 98 percent of humanity and “is strengthened by the searing memories of
soldiers suffocating in the trenches; Jews slaughtered in gas chambers; Iranians poisoned in the many
tens of thousands”); 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 599, supra note 108 (describing the President’s
views and “calculus” on Syria).
110. 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 655, supra note 2, at 2.
111. Syria Crisis: Russia and China Step up Warning over Strike, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013,
05:52 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23845800.
112. The President’s News Conference in St. Petersburg, Russia, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
606, at 3 (Sept. 6, 2013).
113. See Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Australia,
Canada, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, and the United Kingdom, 2013 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 607 (Sept. 6, 2013).
114. Id. at 1.
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the Obama administration found few states with the resources and political
will to contribute to military action and began to make preparations to act
alone.115
Political obstacles faced by the Obama administration further
obscured the U.S. position on the responsibility to protect. Perhaps as a
result of underwhelming support from the international community,
President Obama announced that he would seek approval from Congress116
for military action against Syria.117 Even limited military intervention
proved to be unpopular with the American public, making congressional
support for action improbable.118 Further, critics argued that seeking
congressional approval made President Obama, and by extension the
United States, appear “weak” to the international community.119 Others
maintained that President Obama’s actions were indicative of his
115. See Mark Lander et al., Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria as British Vote No, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/obama-syria.html (reporting that
after Prime Minister Cameron lost the vote, U.S. officials emphasized that “eroding support would not
deter Mr. Obama”). Further, the Navy moved a fifth destroyer into the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Id.
116. Scholars debate whether such approval is necessary under the Constitution. Compare Charles
A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 701
(1972) (“Evidence from the years immediately following ratification of the Constitution thus
corroborates the conclusion that Americans originally understood Congress to have at least a
coordinate, and probably the dominant, role in initiating all but the most obviously defensive wars,
whether declared or not.”), with John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996) (“The Framers established
a system which was designed to encourage presidential initiative in war, but which granted Congress an
ultimate check on executive actions. Congress could express its opposition to executive war decisions
only by exercising its powers over funding and impeachment. . . . The President was seen as the
protector and representative of the People. In contrast, the Framers expressed a deep concern regarding
the damage that Congress, and the interest groups that could dominate it, might cause in the delicate
areas of war and foreign policy.”).
117. Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html; see also
Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting Draft Legislation Regarding Authorization for Use of
United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Conflict in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
597 (Aug. 31, 2013).
118. President Obama faced difficulty advocating for intervention in Syria to the international
community and domestically. See CABLE NEWS NETWORK & ORC, POLL 8, INTERVIEWS WITH 1,022
ADULT AMERICANS CONDUCTED BY TELEPHONE (2013), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/
2013/images/09/09/6a.poll.syria.pdf (finding that less than half of Americans supported military
intervention, 69% believed that intervention was not in the interest of the United States, and 72%
believed that intervention would not accomplish significant American goals).
119. See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Lauren D’Avolio, Former Defense Secretaries Criticize Obama
on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/world/middleeast/gatesand-panetta-critical-of-obama-on-syria.html (“[Former Defense Secretary Leon] Panetta said that the
president ‘has to retain the responsibility and the authority on this issue,’ and that it was wrong to
‘subcontract’ the decision to Congress.”). The article also quotes Panetta saying, “[T]here’s no question
in my mind [Iran is] looking at the situation, and what they are seeing right now is an element of
weakness.” Id.
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unwillingness to take full political responsibility for a Syrian
intervention.120 To pitch the President’s position, Secretary of State John
Kerry presented the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a draft
resolution authorizing the use of force.121 During his remarks, Secretary
Kerry seemed to make a responsibility to protect-based appeal, stating,
“This is not the time for armchair isolationism. This is not the time to be
spectators to slaughter.”122
B. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, unlike the United States, has explicitly endorsed
the responsibility to protect as a legal basis for the use of force, with or
without a Security Council resolution.123 During the Balkan War in the late
1990s, the United Kingdom defended NATO actions as a legal
humanitarian intervention. During Security Council debates, the United
Kingdom’s representative argued that “[t]he action being taken was
legal . . . . It was justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. . . . [T]here was convincing
evidence that such a catastrophe was imminent.”124
After the chemical attacks in Syria, the British government elaborated
on its Kosovo position. The Prime Minister’s Office circulated a
memorandum outlining three conditions for humanitarian intervention:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to
the use of force if lives are to be saved; and
120. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Obama is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, SLATE (Sept. 3,
2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/obama_
going_to_congress_on_syria_he_s_actually_strengthening_the_war_powers.html (“The president’s
announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. . . . If Congress now approves
the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress
rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children.”).
121. John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Remarks Before the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 3, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2013/09/212603.htm).
122. Id.
123. Guidance: Chemical Weapons Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, PRIME
MINISTER’S OFFICE (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weaponuse-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-ukgovernment-legal-position-html-version [hereinafter Syrian Guidance].
124. Press Release, Security Council, NATO Action Against Serbian Military Targets Prompts
Divergent Views as Security Council Holds Urgent Meeting on Situation in Kosovo 9–10, U.N. Press
Release SC/6657 (Mar. 24, 1999).
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(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the
aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time
and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end
and for no other purpose).125

However, the British Parliament foreclosed direct
involvement in Syria by defeating an authorizing resolution.126

military

C. France
France has been one of the most vocal advocates of the responsibility
to protect. In 2009, Ambassador Ripert explained, “France is particularly
attached to the concrete implementation of the concept of the responsibility
to protect. It is an ambitious concept: It calls for intervening not only at the
height of crises to stop the most atrocious crimes. It calls for acting in
advance to prevent them.”127 With the support of the Security Council,128
France sent military forces into Mali to prevent humanitarian catastrophes
and to regain control of the northern part of the country, where Al-Qaedabacked Islamists had imposed sharia law.129 At a General Assembly
dialogue on the responsibility to protect, Ambassador Araud called for
action in Syria:
[T]he Syrian government is in the process of murdering its own people.
More than 100,000 people have died. The Syrian government, while
showing complete indifference, used its air assets and then artillery
against civilian neighborhoods, in violation of international humanitarian
law, and is now using chemical weapons. It first of all tested the waters
by using them in a limited way. It’s now using them on a massive scale,
which doesn’t surprise anyone. I would like to reiterate that all our
meetings focusing on “never again” will do absolutely nothing to
respond to the brutality of a regime that wants to murder its own
people.130

125. Syrian Guidance, supra note 123.
126. Lander et al., supra note 115.
127. Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Representative of Fr. to the United Nations, Statement on the
Protection of Civilians (Jan. 14, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-theunited-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/security-council/january-2009-1025/article/14january-2009-debate-on-the) [hereinafter Ripert Statement].
128. S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012).
129. Adam Nossiter & Eric Schmitt, France Battling Islamists in Mali, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebels-france.html.
130. Gérard Araud, Permanent Representative of Fr. to the United Nations, Statement on Informal
Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Sept. 11, 2013) (transcript available at http://
www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/generalassembly/article/11-september-2013-general-assembly).
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France also led a UN-sanctioned military campaign in the Central
African Republic (CAR) to prevent escalating retaliatory attacks between
the Muslim and Christian populations.131 Further, in an effort to prevent
gridlock, France has argued that permanent Security Council members
should refrain from using vetoes when mass atrocities have occurred.132
D. China
From the outset, China has flatly rejected the reconceptualization of
sovereignty advocated by Secretary-General Annan and proponents of the
responsibility to protect. It believes that “opposition to international
intervention is consistent with internationally recognized standards of
morality, international law, and pragmatism.”133 During a 2009 General
Assembly debate, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin stated:
[T]he implementation of “R2P” [the responsibility to protect] should not
contravene the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of noninterference of internal affairs [of States]. Although the world has
undergone complex and profound changes . . . . [t]here must not be any
wavering over the principles of respecting state sovereignty and noninterference of internal affairs.134

The way in which the responsibility to protect could be implemented
under these parameters is unclear.135 China warned that intervention in
Syria “would have dire consequences for regional security and violate the
norms governing international relations.”136 China has been clear about its

131. John Irish & Bate Felix, France Says EU Countries to Send Troops to C. African Republic,
REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2013, 4:26 PM EST, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/uscentralafrican-france-idUSBRE9BG0Y020131217.
132. Araud, supra note 130.
133. Jia Qingguo, China, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE EVOLVING ASIAN DEBATE 19,
21–22 (Watanabe Koji ed., 2003) (noting that Chinese policy opposed international intervention
because intervention: (1) was driven by Western domination of international affairs and the
continuation of colonial power structures, (2) lacks political legitimacy, (3) violates the UN Charter, (4)
is generally a façade for the intervening state’s interests, and (5) is counterproductive and exacerbates
existing problems).
134. Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Statement at the Plenary Session of
the General Assembly on the Question of “Responsibility to Protect” (Jul. 24, 2009) (transcript
available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Statement%20by%20Ambassador%20Liu%20Zhenmin.
pdf).
135. Alex de Waal, “My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded”: Africa’s Responses to the Libya
Conflict, in LIBYA: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 65, at 58, 58–61.
136. Obama Advocates Limited Strikes in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.
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belief that intervention absent a Security Council resolution is per se
illegal.137 Further, it has emphasized that, even with a Security Council
resolution, intervention violates both the principles of sovereignty and the
prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter.138
E. Russia
Since the 1990s, Russia has generally acted as a “bulwark of the
traditional legal order centred on the UN Charter framework. . . . tend[ing]
to outflank China as the Security Council member most insistent in the
defence of a pluralist, sovereignty-focused view of international order.”139
The NATO-led interventions in Kosovo prompted Mikhail Gorbachev to
decry the NATO agenda as an attempt to “offer the world its military
intervention in any internal conflict, in exchange for principles of
international law.”140 Unlike China, however, Russia has occasionally
supported humanitarian interventions that work through the Security
Council, as long as the state in crisis can retain veto rights over any
proposed intervention.141
After President Obama articulated support for airstrikes in Syria,
Russia reiterated its opposition to military action absent a Security Council
authorization. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin wrote an editorial in
the New York Times, seeking the support of the American public against a
Syrian campaign.142 He argued that the proposed intervention would be
“unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an
act of aggression.”143 Russia also has traditional ties with and geographic
proximity to states, such as Iran, Syria, and Serbia.144 These links have

aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/20138295234621459.html.
137. Qingguo, supra note 133, at 22.
138. Id.
139. ROY ALLISON, RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 13 (2013). Allison further
notes that this position may reflect Russia’s “relatively weak position [compared to that of the United
States and NATO] in the distribution of global power.” Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 56.
141. Id. at 61, 65–66.
142. See Vladimir V. Putin, Op-Ed., A Plea for Caution from Russia: What Putin Has to Say to
Americans About Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/
putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old
Bonds Run Deep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/middleeast/
for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html?pagewanted=all (describing the economic and
political ties between Russia and Syria); To Russia, with Love, Sept. 18, 2012, 12:17, http://www.
economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/09/russia-and-serbia (describing the depth of the
Russian/Serbian relationship).
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prompted especially strong reactions against perceived U.S. and NATO
“hegemony” in this region.145
*
*
*
As discussed in the previous sections, the responsibility to protect
remains controversial among powerful states. The developing world is also
divided between states that prioritize traditional notions of sovereignty146
and those that want the international community to be more involved in
humanitarian pursuits.147 The Syrian crisis did not foster consensus among
states and perhaps deepened the divide. Some commentators argue that the
lack of international intervention in Syria—over both the use of chemical
weapons and the staggering civil war civilian death toll—represent
significant setbacks for the responsibility to protect doctrine.148
V. DE LEGE LATA: THE STATUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is based primarily on treaties and customary
international law (CIL). To date, states have not concluded a treaty
codifying the responsibility to protect. This section, drawing on the
examples of state practice in the sections above, considers the legality of
each under customary international law.
CIL has two components: state practice and opinio juris sive
necessitatis (opinio juris).149 In other words, CIL is shown by “a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”150 State practice is discerned from observing the behavior of
145. ALLISON, supra note 139, at 13–14. Russia views U.S. and NATO efforts to circumvent the
Security Council as the perpetuation of a hegemonic international order. Id. From its perspective, great
powers (including Russia) should collectively determine norms and rules, similar to the original
understanding of the UN. Id.
146. See Edward C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect, in THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13–14 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011)
(“[S]ome smaller and developing countries have had reservations about embracing the concept.”).
147. South American and African states (especially those who have been suffered genocide) have
been vocally supportive. For a summary of states’ positions, see WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT–
INST. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y, STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2005)
[hereinafter STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS], available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/
Chart_R2P_11August.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Stuart Gottlieb, Syria and the Demise of the Responsibility to Protect, NAT’L INT.,
Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/syria-the-demise-the-responsibility-protect9360 (“There is no sugar-coating the damage done to the cause of humanitarian intervention by the
global wavering over Syria.”).
149. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEMORIENTED APPROACH 77–79 (3d ed. 2010).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987). The ICJ has also repeatedly endorsed this two-part framework. See, e.g., Continental Shelf
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states over time.151 Behavior can include a wide range of activity, such as
military action, official statements, and voting records in international
institutions.152 Practice need not be universal but must be “virtually
uniform” and “extensive and representative.”153 The length of time
required for state practice to become custom depends on the circumstances;
the inquiry should focus on the “density” of the practice, not the length.154
Opinio juris, known as the subjective component of international law,
reflects the rationale for a state’s behavior.155 It results from a sense of
legal obligation, not merely one of convenience or courtesy.156 Although
states may not explicitly reference international law norms when acting,
opinio juris can be inferred from the nature and circumstances of their
behavior.157
The responsibility to protect could be represented in CIL in three
ways. First, states may feel that they are legally obligated to protect others
from atrocities in all cases. This is a non-starter, however. If the
responsibility to protect obligates states to act, then failure to protect should
trigger legal sanctions,158 which have never been contemplated by the
international community. Additionally, if states were legally bound to
protect, political willpower would not be the determining factor in whether
intervention occurs.
Second, states may feel legally authorized under CIL to act when the
Security Council votes to approve humanitarian intervention.159 Lastly, a
CIL norm could allow states to intervene without a UN resolution. These
(Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 30); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 7 (Feb. 20). But see Maurice Mendelson, The Subjective Element in Customary
International Law, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 177, 201 (1995) (arguing that evidence of opinio juris is
“definitely unhelpful” for ascertaining whether customary international law has been created).
151. ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–
57 (2013).
152. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 149.
153. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L. REV.
RED CROSS 175, 180 (2005).
154. COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2000).
155. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 149.
156. Id. at 79.
157. Id.
158. STRAUSS, supra note 90, at 39.
159. CIL dictates the interpretation of the Security Council’s powers and fills in the gaps in the UN
Charter. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 434–502 (June 27) (using CIL to interpret the parameters of self-defense under the UN
Charter).
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last two potential grounds for intervention are described below.
A. Action Through the Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers
1. State Practice
Over the past fifteen years, states, scholars, and international
institutions have published extensively on humanitarian intervention.
Diplomats have produced agreements such as the World Summit Outcome,
a product of the largest ever gathering of heads of state.160 Similarly, two
consecutive Secretaries-General have prioritized effectuating the doctrine
and have published extensively on its value.161 These documents allocate
the responsibility to intervene to the Security Council.162 In addition to
statements and publications, the Security Council has authorized
humanitarian interventions through its Chapter VII powers. Although the
UN Charter restricts Security Council action to threats to “international
peace and security,”163 this textual limit has not prevented Security Council
intervention in Libya or the CAR.164
2. Opinio Juris
Today, few states challenge the legal authority of the Security Council
to take action in other states for humanitarian purposes. Many states that
do not authorize or support humanitarian intervention have endorsed the
legality of Security Council-led interventions. For example, Russia and
China, strong critics of the responsibility to protect, signed the World
Summit Outcome and have abstained from voting on or have voted in favor
of interventions.165 Russia has accepted the legality of Security Council
action when extreme human rights abuses are occurring, whether the state
offers permission or not,166 but China has continued to insist that

160. UN World Summit Adopts Landmark Outcome Document on Raft of Crucial Issues, UN
NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15853.
161. See supra notes 22–23, 34–40 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
163. U.N. Charter art. 39.
164. See supra Part III.B and note 131 and accompanying text.
165. Libya, Mali, and the CAR are examples. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Grants Year-Long Mandate Extension for United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in
Central African Republic, U.N. Press Release SC/11264 (Jan. 28, 2014); see also ALLISON, supra note
139, at 36–37 (detailing Russian support for the intervention in Kuwait). The Security Council has also
created an “intervention brigade” to keep the peace in Congo. U.N. Approves New Forces to Pursue
Congo’s Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/africa/unapproves-new-force-to-pursue-congos-rebels.html?_r=0.
166. ALLISON, supra note 139, at 69. Under Putin’s leadership, however, Russian has become less
supportive of its legality. Id. at 69–70.
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humanitarian intervention must respect traditional conceptions of
sovereignty.167
B. Unilateral Action Without Security Council Approval
1. State Practice
Some state practice supports the legality of the responsibility to
protect without Security Council authorization.
NATO invoked
168
Several states
humanitarian considerations when intervening in Kosovo.
joined or supported NATO action.169 Further, the African Union
Constitutive Act authorizes the Union to intervene in a Member State
“pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”170 Similarly,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established
its own Mediation and Security Council to “decide on all matters relating to
peace and security.”171 Finally, through official statements and legal
memoranda, the UK, France, and the United States have expressed
willingness to act outside the Security Council in Syria.172
Several states, however, including Russia and China, strongly objected
to NATO actions in Kosovo and to the proposed unilateral intervention in
Syria.173 The majority of states have rejected unilateral action as a response
to humanitarian crises.174 Thus, state action with respect to intervention
without Security Council approval has been inconsistent and seems to fall
short of the virtual uniformity necessary for recognition as customary
international law.175

167. See infra Part VI.B.
168. See supra Part III.A.
169. See supra Part III.A.
170. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), adopted July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
171. Economic Community of West African States, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1998),
available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en.
The ECOWAS
Mediation and Security Council can authorize military missions when “serious and massive” human
rights violations occur or if a rebel group threatens to overthrow a democratically elected government.
Id. art. 1. The Protocol requires ECOWAS to inform the Security Council of an intervention but does
not require a Security Council resolution. Id.
172. See supra Part IV.
173. See Tisdell, supra note 72.
174. See STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS, supra note 147.
175. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 68–70 (describing the inconsistencies in how the responsibility to
protect has been implemented).
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2. Opinio Juris
Some states, such as Belgium and the UK, have explicitly articulated
legal justifications for humanitarian intervention. Before NATO bombing
began, FRY officials filed applications against several NATO countries in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).176 While most countries solely
contested the ICJ’s jurisdiction,177 Belgium addressed the issue of
humanitarian intervention during oral argument. Belgium’s representative,
Professor Ergec, argued that NATO’s actions were consistent with the UN
Charter because NATO was not acting “against” the territorial integrity of
the FRY.178 Instead, he maintained that
NATO intervened to protect fundamental values enshrined in the jus
cogens and to prevent an impending catastrophe . . . . Thus this is not an
intervention against the territorial integrity or independence of the
former Republic of Yugoslavia. The purpose of NATO’s intervention is
to rescue a people in peril, in deep distress.179

Thus, according to Belgium, NATO’s bombing campaign did not
violate the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter.
Similarly, the UK has outlined a legal framework that supports unilateral
intervention if it fits into certain parameters.180
Unilateral intervention, however, is not widely viewed as legally
authorized under international law. Many states, including China, believe
that such intervention would violate international law, not put the state in
conformity with it.181 A UN-sponsored investigative panel labeled the
intervention in Kosovo “illegal but legitimate” because NATO did not
receive Security Council authorization before intervention.182 Further,
Secretary-General Ban maintains that the “responsibility to protect does not
alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain
176. See e.g. Press Release 1999/33, Int’l Court of Justice, The Court Rejects the Request for the
indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by Yugoslavia and Dismisses the Case (June 2, 1999);
Press Release 1999/32, Int’l Court of Justice, The Court Rejects the Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures Submitted by Yugoslavia, but Remains Seized of the Case (June 2, 1999).
177. See, e.g., Preliminary Objections of the French Republic, Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. Fr.) ¶¶1–3 (July 5, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/107/10873.pdf;
Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.) ¶1.1
(June 5, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/113/10883.pdf.
178. Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, at 12 (May 10, 1999,
3:00 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4473.pdf.
179. Id. at 11–12.
180. See supra Part IV.B.
181. See supra Part IV.D.
182. KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 61, at 4.
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from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter.”183
VI. DE LEGE FERENDA: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS A
CIL NORM
If effectuated, the responsibility to protect doctrine can serve as the
basis for states to prevent atrocities and mitigate disaster abroad. This
section argues that the Security Council’s capacity to authorize
humanitarian interventions should be definitively established in CIL. Thus,
the responsibility to protect should act as an effective legal tool to prevent
atrocities, rather than a convenient justification to circumvent international
law.
A. Addressing Sovereignty Concerns
The UN was founded in the wake of the devastation of war and the
horrors of genocide. The international community vowed, through
multilateral cooperation, to prevent such atrocities from occurring again.184
The Security Council is a product of these aspirations.185 Therefore,
implementing a doctrine, such as the responsibility to protect, that seeks to
effectuate these goals should be a priority of the institution.
Critics of the responsibility to protect argue that traditional notions of
sovereignty prevent uninvited intrusions into domestic affairs, even if
widespread atrocities are taking place.186 Yet sovereignty is not and has
never been an absolute.187 Here the option of humanitarian intervention
only exists if the state is manifestly failing to protect its citizenry. Indeed,
a “sovereign” state that has failed in this most basic duty can hardly
complain about violations of sovereignty.
Others condemn the responsibility to protect as too easy to manipulate
or abuse, arguing that it is merely a platform for states to pursue selfish
motivations or a thin veil for Western imperialism.188 In the West, some
critics view humanitarian intervention as impracticable in a post-9/11
world.189 In response to these criticisms, Bass argues that (1) imperialism

183. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677
(Jan. 12, 2009).
184. U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1.
185. U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1, 7.
186. See supra Parts IV.D–E.
187. See BASS, supra note 4, at 352–56 (arguing that the definition of sovereignty has changed
throughout history). Further, Bass maintains that respect for “territorial integrity” often serves as “the
best argument of the butchers in the Rwandan and Serbian governments.” Id. at 355.
188. BASS, supra note 4, at 376–82.
189. Id. (describing arguments against humanitarian intervention centered on national security and
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and humanitarianism should not be equated or blurred, (2) humanitarian
intervention is possible, even in a world where terrorism and security
threats are prevalent, and (3) humanitarian intervention can be a part of
promoting democratic governments and dissuading radicalism.190 Again,
such concerns are also mitigated by the extreme circumstances required for
an intervention under the responsibility to protect.
B. Practical Considerations: Bringing Intervention Back to the Security
Council
Currently, powerful states have the resources and incentives to work
outside the UN system, in violation of international law. Though Russia
and China can veto a resolution authorizing humanitarian intervention or
can threaten to do so, the United States, France, and the UK have acted
outside the Security Council and have explicitly stated that they believe it
is in their rights to do so.191 In support of these assertions, former U.S.
legal advisor Harold Koh and former British Legal Adviser Daniel
Bethlehem have argued for a broader understanding of permissible uses of
force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.192 Others believe that the
procedural unfairness surrounding the P5 in the Security Council allows
states to pursue illegal but otherwise justified interventions.193 Yet working
outside the UN undermines the credibility of the international legal
system’s most stable and powerful body,194 further threatening the
principles that the UN was founded to promote and protect.

terrorism concerns).
190. Id. at 379–82.
191. See supra Parts IV.A–C.
192. See Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle
of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-amoment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/; Harold Hongju Koh,
Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward),
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/.
193. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Does It Matter If US Intervention in Syria Violates the UN Charter?,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/08/matter-usintervention-syria-violates-un-charter/.
194. See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Op-Ed., On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-un-vote-isntoptional.html?_r=0 (questioning whether “employing force to punish Mr. Assad’s use of chemical
weapons is worth endangering the fragile international order that is World War II’s most significant
legacy”); see also PAUL F.J. ARANAS, SMOKESCREEN: THE U.S., NATO AND THE ILLEGITIMATE USE OF
FORCE 143–50 (2012) (describing how violations of the UN Charter by powerful states, such as the
United States, undermine the legitimacy of the UN as an institution).
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VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
Past failures and the limitations of the current system demonstrate the
need for reform and a framework to decide when an intervention should
take place under the responsibility to protect. This section advocates for
such a framework.
A. What Situations?
As Deng articulated in the conception of the doctrine, the
responsibility to protect is the original duty of the host state. Only a failure
of this duty can trigger international oversight.
When the state fails this duty, under circumstances described below,
the international community is authorized, but not obligated, to act.195
Facially, this construction creates tension with a responsibility to protect
and prompts theoretical questions of whether humanitarian intervention is a
right or a duty.196 While the conceptualization of the responsibility as a
general duty has great force, current realities counsel a more flexible
approach. Practically speaking, an obligation to protect is unlikely to
garner the necessary support to be implemented. Additionally, this
framework provides a baseline in hopes that, after successful humanitarian
interventions, a sense of obligation will begin to coalesce. Eventually, this
sense of obligation may form opinio juris.
The crimes must be of a severity and type that warrant international
attention. Consensus has emerged around four crimes: genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.197 In addition, the
international community’s response to unsuccessful appeals to the

195. See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 25–26 (2011) (describing the position that the word “responsibility” does not impose
obligations for states but rather confers authority). This position was articulated in “Dear Colleague”
letters sent to the 190 other participants of the World Summit. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Bolton,
U.S. Ambassador to United Nations, to UN Member States 2 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf (relaying U.S.
amendments to the draft Outcome Document being prepared for the High-Level Event on the
Responsibility to Protect). Ambassador Bolton stated that the United States does not believe that the
United Nations has “an obligation to intervene under international law. . . . [UN Action] should depend
on the specific circumstances. Accordingly, we should avoid language that focuses on the obligation or
responsibility of the international community and instead assert that we are prepared to take action.” Id.
These changes are largely reflected in the World Summit Outcome. See generally G.A. Res. 60/1,
supra note 30.
196. See JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION & THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
15–20 (2010) (comparing duties and rights arguments and concluding that sufficiently legitimate states
have a general, unassigned duty to intervene, which translates into an assigned duty for the most
legitimate state).
197. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 30.
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responsibility to protect seemingly imposes two additional requirements on
situations involving these four crimes: “(1) a requirement that the use of
coercion be preceded by compelling evidence of genocide or mass
atrocities; (2) a relatively narrow interpretation of ‘crimes against
humanity’ that excludes crimes not associated with the deliberate killing
and displacement of civilians.”198 These requirements ensure that only the
most egregious human rights violations are addressed. The international
community does not possess the political will or resources to intervene in
every human rights violation.
B. Process
The interests of the international community are best served if
enforcement action decisions are made in the Security Council, but it has
ineffectively addressed severe human rights violations. These reforms
could confront the deadlock that has plagued the Security Council in crises
like those in Syria, Darfur, and Kosovo.
1. A UN agency should be established to determine if one of the four
crimes above has taken place and if diplomatic solutions have been
exhausted or would be ineffective
When a state or group of states intervenes in another state, the motives
of the intervening states are questioned. Ascertaining a state’s “true”
motive for any behavior is difficult, however. Often, several factors guide
a state’s behavior, such that “humanitarian motives may be genuine but
may be only one part of a larger constellation of motivations driving state
action.”199 Transferring the responsibility to an independent agency could
alleviate some of these motive-based concerns by ensuring that a legitimate
basis for intervention exists.
This agency, established by the Secretary-General, would collect
evidence to determine whether one of the four actionable violations has
occurred. Definitions of the relevant human rights violations are well
established by treaties200 and jus cogens.201 An investigation could be
initiated (1) at the request of a General Assembly member, (2) by the
198. BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 69.
199. Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CULTURE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 153, 158 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed.,
1996).
200. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
201. See generally RAFAEL NIETO-NAVIA, INTERNATIONAL PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS)
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
WritingColombiaEng.pdf.
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Secretary-General, or (3) by the agency itself. UN members would be
obligated to grant the agency technological assistance, monetary support,
and safe passage. Further, member states would be obligated to cooperate
fully with any investigation.
2. If this agency found compelling evidence of an actionable violation,
it would issue a recommendation of action to the Security Council and the
General Assembly.
An independent agency could also address the political will problems
that doomed the interventions in Darfur and Rwanda. If the agency were to
determine that genocide or a mass atrocity were occurring, the Security
Council would likely face international and domestic pressure to act.
Additionally, the General Assembly would have access to the report and
could further pressure Security Council action.
In democratic states, three institutions create pressure: “a free press,
free civil society, and governments that respond to public opinion.”202
Mass media has played a significant role in increasing public awareness of
human rights crises, thus acting as a “crucial first step toward a
humanitarian intervention.”203 A finding of genocide from a credible,
independent UN agency would intensify the attention and scrutiny of
international media. Such scrutiny would ramp up public pressure for
action.
Russia and China, however, remain insulated from these
pressures.204 To respond to this political insulation and lack of will to act,
France has suggested that P5 states formally or informally agree to refrain
from vetoing resolutions aimed at stopping human rights abuses.205 Given
Russian and Chinese distrust of Western-led interventions, this concession,
though perhaps desirable, is highly unlikely.
The establishment of an agency can still serve several important
functions, however. It can cement the status of the responsibility to protect
as a CIL norm. States can further discuss desirable parameters for
intervention and alleviate concerns of Western imperialism. Additionally,

202. BASS, supra note 4, at 28.
203. Id. at 25.
204. See, e.g., REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2013 (2013),
available at http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf. The report describes how Russia’s
free press ranking (148 out of 179 countries) “has fallen again because, since Vladimir Putin’s return to
the presidency, repression has been stepped up . . . . The country also continues to be marked by the
unacceptable failure to punish all those who have murdered or attacked journalists.” Id. at 5. The
report also details that China, which ranks 173 out of 179, “still refuse[s] to grant [its] citizens the
freedom to be informed. The control of news and information is a key issue for [China], which [is]
horrified at the prospect of being open to criticism.” Id. at 10.
205. See Ripert Statement, supra note 127.
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supplying monetary support and focusing international attention on human
rights violations could both increase political pressure to respond and even
inspire change on the ground.
CONCLUSION
The responsibility to protect could be a valuable tool for preventing
widespread human rights violations. When atrocities occur, the legitimacy
and purposes of the UN and international law are best served by having
intervening states work through the UN system. Establishing a framework
for action through an independent UN agency could help the responsibility
to protect bridge the gap between legitimacy and legality in humanitarian
intervention. Bridging this gap is not only important for international law
and the UN system but also for protecting potential victims of human rights
abuses.

